Game theory applied to Protection against SIS Epidemics in Networks
Time: 14:30 -- Location: LIX
Defining an optimal protection strategy against viruses, spam propagation or any other kind of contamination process is an important feature for designing new networks and architectures. In this work, we consider decentralized optimal protection strategies when a virus is propagating over a network through a SIS epidemic process. We assume that each node in the network can fully protect itself from infection at a constant cost, or the node can use recovery software, once it is infected. We model our system using a congestion game theoretic framework (due to Rosenthal) and find pure, mixed equilibria, and the Price of Anarchy (PoA) in several network topologies. We finally propose extensions of both the SIS propagation model as well as of the protection strategies and evaluate their performance. This work was done within the CONGAS European project on games in complex systems with the authors Stojan Trajanovski, Yezekael Hayel, Huijuan Wang and Piet Van Mieghem